CERT (sm) Summary
CS-99-01
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CERT
advisory CA-99-01 Melissa Macro Virus
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CERT Summary CS-99-01 February 23, 1999
The CERT Coordination Center periodically issues the CERT summary to draw attention to the types of attacks currently being reported to our incident response team, as well as to other noteworthy incident and vulnerability information. The summary includes pointers to sources of information for dealing with the problems.
Past CERT summaries are available from http://www.cert.org/summaries/ ______________________________________________________________________
Recent Activity
Since the last CERT summary, issued in December 1998 (CS-98.08), we have seen these trends in incidents reported to us.
1. Widespread Scans We
continue to receive numerous daily reports of intruders using
tools to scan networks for multiple vulnerabilities. Intruder
scanning tools continue to become more sophisticated. On January
28, 1999, we published an incident note describing a new scanning
tool that searches for multiple known vulnerabilities on remote
systems. The tool incorporates probes for known vulnerabilities,
remote operating system identification, and a scripting language
that simplifies automation of probes and exploitation attempts.
For more information, see our incident note at http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-99-01.html
Reports also indicate that scanning techniques addressed in
previous CERT incident notes, such as scripted tools and stealth
scanning, are still being employed by intruders.
For more information, see
+ http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-98-06.html
+ http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-98-05.html
+ http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-98.04.html
+ http://www.cert.org/incident_notes/IN-98.02.html
The daily reports of widespread scans and exploitation attempts
involve many vulnerabilities; however, the most frequent reports
involve activity with well-known vulnerabilities in
"mountd", "imap", and "pop3"
services for which CERT advisories have been published. These
services are installed and enabled by default in some operating
systems. The scans and exploitation attempts still result in
sites being compromised.
See the following advisories for more
information:
+ sunrpc (tcp port 111) and mountd (635) http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.12.mountd.html
+ imap (tcp port 143) http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.09.imapd.html
+ pop3 (tcp port 110) http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.08.qpopper_vul.html
We encourage you to make sure that all systems at your site are up to date with patches and that your machines are properly secured.
2. Back Orifice and NetBus We continue to receive daily reports of incidents involving Windows-based "remote administration" programs such as Back Orifice and NetBus. Occasionally these are reports of compromised machines that have one of these tools installed. However, the majority of these reports involve sites that have detected intruders scanning for the presence of these tools. These scans may appear as unauthorized traffic as follows:
+ NetBus - connection requests (SYN) packets to TCP ports 12345, 12346, or 20034
+ Back Orifice - UDP
packets to port 31337 Keep in mind that these tools can be
configured to listen on different ports. Because of this, we
encourage you to investigate any unexplained network traffic. For
more information about Back Orifice, review
CERT vulnerability note VN-98.07: http://www.cert.org/vul_notes/VN-98.07.backorifice.html
3. Trojan Horse Programs
Over the past few months, we have seen an increase in the number
of incident reports related to Trojan horse programs affecting
both Windows and UNIX platforms.
+ CERT advisory CA-99-02 includes descriptions
of several recent incidents involving Trojan horse programs,
including a false upgrade to Internet Explorer, a Trojan horse
version of TCP Wrappers, and a Trojan horse version of
util-linux. The advisory also provides advice for system and
network administrators, end users, software developers, and
distributors. The advisory is available from http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-02-Trojan-Horses.html
+ CERT advisory CA-99-01, discusses the Trojan
horse version of TCP Wrappers in greater detail, and provides
information on how to verify the integrity of your TCP Wrappers
distribution. http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-01-Trojan-TCP-Wrappers.html
4. FTP Buffer Overflows Very recently, we have received a few reports of intruders scanning for and exploiting a remote buffer overflow vulnerability in various FTP servers. By supplying carefully designed commands to the FTP server, intruders can force the server to execute arbitrary commands with root privilege. Intruders can exploit the vulnerability remotely to gain administrative access. We encourage you to review text provided by Netect, Inc. in CERT advisory CA-99-03, which describes the ftpd vulnerability in more detail. The advisory is available from http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-99-03-FTP-Buffer-Overflows.html __________________________________________________________________
What's New and Updated Since the last CERT summary, we have developed new and updated + Advisories + Incident notes + Security improvement modules + Technical reports + The CERT/CC 1998 Annual Report + Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT) Handbook + Incident response courses There are descriptions of these documents and links to them on our What's New web page at http://www.cert.org/nav/whatsnew.html __________________________________________________________________
This document is available from: http://www.cert.org/summaries/CS-99-01.html.
______________________________________________________________________
CERT/CC Contact Information
Email: cert@cert.org
Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline)
Fax: +1 412-268-6989
Postal address:
CERT Coordination Center
Software Engineering Institute
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890
U.S.A.
CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / EDT(GMT-4)
Monday through Friday; they are on call for emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on weekends. Using encryption We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by email. Our public PGP key is available from http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key. If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more information.
Getting security information CERT publications and other security information are available from our web site http://www.cert.org/. To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, send email to cert-advisory-request@cert.org and include SUBSCRIBE your-email-address in the subject of your message.
Copyright 1999 Carnegie Mellon University. Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information can be found in http://www.cert.org/legal_stuff.html.
* "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
______________________________________________________________________
NO WARRANTY Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from patent, trademark, or copyright infringement.
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